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OPTIMAL COMMERCIAL POLICY FOR A MINIMUM-WAGE ECONOMY*
Richard A. Brecher

INTRODUCTI ON

The standard Heckscher-Ohlin analysis of an open economy has been extended
to consider the welfare implications of various factor-market imperfections.
Two such imperfections may be seen as polar types. 1

In one of these cases,

there is a distortive wage differential between sectors, with perfect flexibil
ity of the real wage ensuring full employment of labor.

In the other case,

there is wage equality between sectors, with downward inflexibility of the
(uniform) real wage leading to unemployment of labor.

For the first case,

Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963) and Bhagwati, Ramaswami and Srinivasan (1969)
have established a welfare ranking of alternative commercial policies.

The

present paper performs a similar type of exercise for the second case, which
has been discussed by Haberler (1960), Johnson (1965), Bhagwati (1968) and
Brecher (1974).

2

Part I briefly reviews the model in which the entire labor market is sub
ject to an exogenously specified floor, or minimum, that constrains the real
wage to exceed the maximum level consistent with full employment.

Within this

constrained-wage context, Part II considers various commercial policies of the

*This paper draws upon parts of my (1971) Ph.D. thesis. For their guidance and
encouragement of this work, I am deeply indebted to Richard E. Caves, chairman
of my dissertation committee, and to Jagdish N. Bhagwati and Thomas 0. Horst,
members of this committee. I also wish to thank Lucy A. Cardwell, Vahid F.
Nowshirvani and Ian C. Parker for discussing the material with me extensively,
T. N. Srinivasan for suggesting major improvements in the paper, and anonymous referees
for providing helpful comments and suggestions. Of course, I alone am responsible for any remaining errors or shortcomings.
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home country (i.e., the minimum-wage country), assuming that this economy has
monopoly power in trade and remains incompletely specialized.

Three policy

combinations are ranked in increasing order of social-welfare optimality, as
follows:

1)

a trade tax (subsidy) in the absence of complementary commercial

intervention; 2)

a trade tax (subsidy) together with a consumption tax-cum

subsidy favoring one commodity; and 3)

a trade tax together with a factor tax

cum-subsidy favoring the use of labor uniformly in all sectors, which is a
first-best policy package.

In case some of these taxes and subsidies are un

available (see below), the discussion has been designed to show how to make
the most of whichever ones actually can be used.
the

policy

ranking,

In proceeding upwards through

there is an increase not only in the maximum achievable

level of social welfare, but also in this level's corresponding quantity of
overall labor employment.

I.

THE MODEL

Section A considers the production side of a minimum-wage economy.

Then,

home and foreign demand are introduced in Section B, so that the full inter
national equilibrium can be determined in Section C.

Finally, Section D derives

the consumption-possibility frontier to be used in Part II.
A.

Production
Before introducing the wage constraint, recall the standard two-factor, two-good

model of trade theory.

Two commodities (one and two) are produced in amounts x1 and

x2 , using 1 1 and 1 2 units of labor plus K1 and K2 units of capital, with strictly concave production functions exhibiting homogeneity of degree one:
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X.
l

where k.
l

= K./1.
l
l

=

F.(K.,L.)
l

l

l

.•
= F./L
l
l

and f.
l

= L.f.(k.)
l

l

l

i - 1,2

• • • ( 1)

The economy is endowed with fixed, overall factor

supplies (Land K), which constrain the total employment levels (Land K):
L

• • • ( 2)

K

• • • ( 3)

Both factors are perfectly mobile domestically.

Entrepreneurs maximize profits

In addition, it will be assumed throughout this

under perfect competition.

paper that home production remains incompletely specialized at all times.
Now subject the entire labor market to a wage floor, which is exogenously
given in real 3 terms.

Let this minimum real wage be set by some institutional

arrangement (such as custom, unions or law), and be specified in terms of the
second

4

good at some fixed

5

level denoted by

w2 •

This minimum-wage constraint

can be written as
. • • ( 4)

>

where w is the economy's (uniform) wage in terms of good two, and (by profit
2
maximization) equals MPL

2

which is the economy's (unifonn) marginal product of

labor in terms of good two.

Because of this wage floor, labor may be unemployed.

However, since the reward of capital is perfectly flexible, capital must be
fully utilized.

Thus,

R =

. • • ( 5)

K

Figure 1 illustrates the familiar relationships between w2 and k 2 (in the
second quadrant) and between k. (i = 1, 2) and w (in the first quadrant), where
l
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6
w denotes the economy's (uniform) wage/rental ratio.

K/1, full employment of both factors is consistent only

given endowment ratio
with w'

~

w

~

w",

7

2 ~ w2

and hence only with w

2, since

implies w2 > w

It is well known that,

2

w2 has

2.

w

However, constraint (4)

In this case, unemployment of

w > w by assumption.
2

labor is necessary, since

<

been specified to exceed the maximum w2 (and

MPL 2 ) consistent with full employment.
constraint (4) is binding, with w
2

This unemployment of labor implies that

and
=w
2

hence with w

= w.

This binding

case is the interesting one, and the only case considered in this paper.
Figure 1 also shows the well-known Samuelson (1949) relationship between
wand p (in the fourth quadrant), where pis the relative price of the second
The equilibrium wage/rental ratio (w) corresponds

good in terms of the first.

p,

to the equilibrium values

and k •
2

k

1

Since k >
1

f 2 , good one (two) is

relatively capital-intensive (labor-intensive) in the relevant range.
stituting

k1

and

k2

8

Sub

into equations (1) and (5), it follows after simple manipu

lation that

= a

• • • ( 6)

-

where a and Bare constants defined as a= Rf1 (k 1 )/k and B = f 2 f 1 (k 1 )/k 1 f 2 (k 2 ).
1
Equation {6) describes the minimum-wage transformation curve, illustrated by
the straight line R R in Figure 2.
2 1
flatter than R R , since
2 1

k1

>

k2

The equilibrium price line (for

implies

p>

$.

p)

is

[The first-order conditions

for profit maximization can be manipulated to yield
B=

p(wk 2 + k1k2 )/(wk1 + k1k2 )

tal's average products,and
ginal products.]

<

p,

p equ'als

where B was defined as the ratio of capi
the ratio of capital's (and labor's) mar

As output of the (labor-intensive) second good increases with

upward movements along R R , total employment of labor increases.
2 1

[That is,

Commodity Two
(Labor-I tensive)
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Commodity One (Capital-Intensive)

Figure 2
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dL/dX2 =

(k 1

k2 )/k1f 2 (k 2 )

-

O; where equation (5) has been differentiated

>

after substituting from equation (1), using the fact that 1
setting ki = ki.]

1

=L

- 1 , and
2

Line R R lies completely below the conventional (flexible
2 1

wage, full-employment) production-possibility frontier, T T , to reflect the
2 1
existence of unemployed labor.

The minimum-wage transformation curve,

9

RR ,
2 1

is a well-known Rybczynski line described by Mundell (1968).

B.

Demand
Foreign demand is given by the function g(E); where g(O) = O, g'(E)

and dg'(E)/dE

<

O;

10

= dg/dE

and where E denotes foreign net imports (and home net

exports) of good two, exchanging for g(E) of foreign net exports (and home net
imports) of good one.

If E

in which case g > (<) O, the home country

> (<) O,

exports (imports) the second good and imports (exports) the first good.

The

function g may be represented in Figure 2 by a conventional foreign offer curve
like mDM, whose origin (D) has been placed on the transformation curve (R R )
2 1
in the Baldwin (1948) manner.
Home consumption of good i, C. (i = 1, 2), can now be written as
1.

=
= a

• • • ( 7)

E

-

+

g(E)

where use has been made of equation (6).

The levels of c

• • • ( 8)

1

and c 2 completely

determine social welfare in the traditional way, according to the conventional
utility function U(c , c ); where U is a concave function; and the partial
1
2
derivatives of U, Ui

= au(c1 ,

c2 )/aci

(i = 1, 2), are assumed to be positive if

c1 and c 2 are both finite. 11 The function U may be represented by a conventional

> 0
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set of community indifference curves, 12 like I-I and II-II in Figure 2.

It is

assumed throughout this paper that neither good is inferior in home consumption.
C.

Free-Trade Equilibrium
As usual, free-trade equilibrium requires equality among the domestic price

ratio (p), the world price ratio (g/E), and the marginal rate of substitution in
home consumption (U2'U ):
1
g(E)/E

= p

• • • ( 9)

• • • (10)
Equations (7), (8), (9) and (10) together are sufficient to determine all
equilibrium values.
follows.

Free-trade equilibrium may be illustrated in Figure 2 as

Horne production is at D.

The domestic and world price ratio is p.

Horne consumption is at d, where indifference curve I-I touches the social budget
line (for

p)

drawn through D.

The home country trades (at price ratio

p)

to

point d on foreign offer curve rnDM, in this case importing the first good and
exporting the second.

Throughout this paper, equilibrium in world markets is

assumed to be unique and stable.
D.

The Consumption-Possibility Frontier
An

important construction for Part II is the consumption-possibility fron

tier, or Baldwin (1948) envelope, which shows the maximum possible consumption
level of one good for a given consumption level of the other good.
tier is folll1d by maximizing
equations (7) and (8).

c2 ,

subject to a given level of

c1 ,

This fron

and subject to

The first-order conditions of this maximization can be

-9-

manipulated to yield
g'(E)

=

B

• • • (11)

whose unique solution is denoted E.

Substituting E into equations (7) and (8),

= y

• • . (12)

where y is a constant defined as y =a+ g(E) - BE.

Equation (12) describes

the consumption-possibilit y frontier, partially illustrated in Figure 2 by the
straight line b b , which (given its slope of -1/B) is parallel to R R . Line
2 1
2 1
b 2b is part of the outer envelope traced by mDM, as the origin of mDM is
1
allowed to slide along R R with the axes of mDM kept parallel to those of
2 1
R2Rl.

13

II.

POLICY RANKING

This part shows how taxes and subsidies may be used to maximize welfare
when different policy combinations are available.

A welfare ranking is estab

lished for three such combinations, assuming that the home country has monopoly
power in trade and remains

incompletely specialized.

Sections A, Band C con

sider respectively the third-best, second-best and first-best of the three
policy packages analyzed.

As the discussion progresses from the third-best

optimum to the second-best and then to the first-best, the optimal level of
employment increases with the optimal level of social welfare.
A.

Taxes (Subsidies) on Trade
Suppose that trade taxes and trade subsidies are the only forms of commercial

-10-

intervention available.

These policies create a wedge between the domestic

(producer and conswner) price ratio (p) and the world price ratio (g/E).

The

ad valorem trade tax (subsidy), t, is then given by

t

=

[g(E)/E] p-

p

. . . (13)

v1hen the home cotmtry imports the first good (with E, g > 0), and by

t

=

p-

[g(E)/E]
g(E)/E

. . . (14)

when the home cotmtry imports the second good (with E, g < 0).
is taxed, free or subsidized, respectively.

>

As t <

0,

trade

Made here is a conventional asswnp

tion that the government redistributes (finances) all trade taxes (subsidies)
in lump-swn fashion.
The formal problem for optimal trad~ policy is to maximize U(c , c ), sub
1
2
ject to constraints (7), (8) and (10). The first order conditions of this
maximization can be manipulated to yield
g'(E)

=

B

. . . (11)

The unique solution of equation (11), E as before, can be substituted into
equation (13) (if E > 0) or (14) (if E < 0) to calculate the optimal value of
t , denoted t •
The optimal trade strategy is now illustrated in Figure 2 for the case of E >
Welfare maximization is achieved by moving up the income-consumption curve (r

r

)
2 1
corresponding to constraint (10), until such movement is halted (at v) by the con-

sumption-possibility frontier (b b ) characterized by equation (11).
2 1

The value

o.
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oft can be determined by comparing the slope of the domestic price line (Dd)
with the slope of the (optimal) world price line (Vv).

(Vis the optimal pro

duction point where the origin of mDM lies when this curve touches b b at v.)
2 1
Figure 2 (in which v coincides with d and V coincides with D) shows the special
case in which free trade is the optimal strategy.

This prescription arises

because the free-trade slope of mDM (at d) equals the slope of R R , thereby
2 1
indicating that the second goad's marginal cost (in tenns of the first good) is
the same through free trade as through domestic production.

If mDM were redrawn

slightly so that its free-trade slope at d were steeper (flatter) than R R in
2 1
Figure 2, the optimal policy would be a trade tax (subsidy) instead of free trade.
Whatever the value oft, the following two results always hold.
optimal trade strategy does not achieve full employment
and therefore is clearly not a first-best policy.

14

First, the

(on T T in Figure 2),
2 1

Second, the optimal trade

policy is not even second-best, since it leaves u /u =
2 1

p ¥ S,

as at point v in

Figure 2 where indifference curve I-I is not tangent to b b .
2 1
B.

Taxes (Subsidies) on Both Trade and Consumption
. lS tax-cum-s ub si. d.ies, in
•
. is
. poss ible to use consumption
Now suppose tat
h
it

addition to trade taxes (subsidies).

The added policy gives an additional degree

of freedom, by allowing a wedge between the domestic producer price ratio (p)
and the domestic constuner price ratio (equal to

u2 tu1 ).

sidy) oft is still given by equation (13) or (14).

An

An ad valorem trade tax (sub
ad valorem consumption

tax (subsidy) of T, imposed on the first good, is given by
p - [U2(Cl, C2)/Ul(Cl, C2)]
T

:

U2(Cl, C2)/Ul(Cl, C2)

• • • (15)
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As

T

>

=< O, consumption of the first good is taxed, unaffected or subsidized,

respectively.

It is assumed that all such consumption taxes (subsidies) are

redistributed (financed) by the government in lump-sum fashion. 16
The formal problem for• optimal trade policy is now to maximize U(C , c ),
1
2
subject to const:r•aint8 (7) and ( 8) as before--but no longer subject to con
straint ( 10) of the pr•evious section, since

T

is now available.

The first-order

conditions of this maximization can be manipulated to yield
g'(E)

= S

• • • (11)

as before, and

=

8

which differs from equation (10) since p; S.

• • • (16)
The unique solution of equation

(11), E as before, can be substituted into equation (13) or (14) to yield the
optimal t, which is clearly

t

as before.

That is, the optimal trade tax (subsidy)

is the same whether or not it can be combined with the optimal consumption policy.
By equations (15) and (16), the optimal value of
which is positive (recalling
t.

p>

T

(denoted

T)

is

T = (p -

S)/S-

S), independent of E, and hence independent of

Thus, consumption of the capital-intensi ve good should always be taxed at the

same rate, no matter what the optimal trade tax (subsidy).
The optimal strategy is now illustrated in Figure 2.

Welfare maximization

is achieved by consuming on the consumption-p ossibility frontier (b b ) charac
2 1
terized by equation (11), at the point (n) where an indifference curve (II-II)
is tangent to b b in accordance with equation (16).
2 1

As before, tis obtained

by comparing the slope of the domestic producer price line (Dd) with the slope
of the (optimal) world price line (Nn parallel to Vv).

(N is the optimal production

-13-

point where the origin of mDM lies when this curve touches b b at n.)
2 1

The

value of Tis given by,comparing the slope of the domestic producer price line
(dD) with the slope of the (optimal) domestic consumer price line (b b ).
2 1
Whatever the value oft combined with (the positive) T, the following
results always hold.
employment

17

First, optimal welfare and its corresponding level of optimal

always increase when Tis added to t--as in Figure 2, where welfare

is greater at n than at v, and employment is greater at N than at V (recalling
dL/dX

2

> 0).

Second, combining

t

with T achieves the highest level of welfare

consistent with production constraint (6), as in Figure 2 where n lies on the
highest indifference curve consistent with production on R R •
2 1
bination 'oft and

Third, the com

T does not achieve full employment, and is therefore not a

first-best policy package.
C.

Taxes and Subsidies on Both Trade and Factors
Now suppose that it is possible to impose tax-cum-subsidies on factor use,

in addition to trade taxes and trade subsidies.

With an ad valorem labor sub-

sidy of s, applied uniformly in both sectors, the producer's net cost of a unit
of labor is

w2 (1-s)

w2 (1-s)

in terms of good two.

Under profit maximization,

= MPL , which implies
2

s

=

• • • (17)

In other words, a labor subsidy can be used to drive a wedge between the marginal
product of labor and the minimum wage.

This subsidy may be financed either in

lump-sum fashion, or by taxing capital uniformly in both sectors (since the
supply of capital is perfectly inelastic).

By combining a labor subsidy with a

-14-

trade tax, it is possible to reach the first-best solution, as will now be shown.
If the wage were unconstrained, welfare could be maximized simply by appli
cation of the conventional (positive) optimal tariff, denoted t*.

Imposing t*

in the absence of wage rigidity would bring production to the first-best point
on T2T in Figure 2, say point H, where labor's marginal product would be MPL~.
1
However, there actually is? binding minimum-wage constraint, which implies
that

w2

> MPL~.

(Recall that

w2

has been specified to exceed the maximum MPL 2

consistent with full employment.)

This optimal wedge between wage and marginal

product at H can be created with an optimal labor subsidy (denoted s*), given
bys*=

(w2

- MPL~)/w

2

according to equation (17).

This s* must be applied

(in both sectors) along with ti, to achieve the first-best solution.

The unem

ployment effect of the minimum wage is cancelled bys*, while t* restricts trade
to the conventional optimal leve1.

18

This first-best policy combination goes directly to the sources of distor
tion, in keeping with the general prescription of Bhagwati and Ramaswarni (1963).
The labor subsidy is used to correct a domestic distortion due to wage rigidity
in the home labor market.

The trade tax is used to correct a foreign.distortion

arising from monopoly power in international trade.

-15-

FOOTNOTES

1

This polarity has been pointed out by Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1973) who

consider a third closely related type.
2

Lefeber (1971) has also explored this case in a model with one consumer

good and one investment good, instead of the two consumer goods of the tradi
tional model.
3 ' .d.
.
Rigi ity o f t h e nominal
.(.instead of the real ) wage need not lead to un-

employment in the standard barter model of international trade, as pointed out
by Johnson (1969).
4

As shown by Brecher (1971), the following analysis could be extended

readily for a minimum wage specified in terms of either the first good or a
constant-utility combination of both goods.
5

The minimum wage is treated here as a "fact of life" which, for social or

political reasons, government and 1IDions are unable or unwilling to alter within
the time period considered in this paper.

(This assumption does not rule out

the longer-run possibility--not discussed in this paper--of varying the minimum
wage by government action or by union response to the level of tmemployment.)
Consequently, for the welfare maximizations of Part II, the government tz,eats
the wage as a policy constraint rather than a policy tool.

Admittedly, this

type of constrained government also might be unable or unwilling to impose the
labor subsidy required by the first-best solution, which is a reason for con
sidering the other policy packages in the ranking.
6

It is assumed that:

f.{O)
i

= O,

-16-

lim f ! ( k l• )
l.

k. -+

=

O

lim f ! ( k • )

and

l.

l

=

co

for i = 1, 2; where f!l is the

k. -+ 0

co

l

l.

to k l.•
derivative off.l with respect
-·
7

This result follows from the fact that full employment of both factors is

8wbether or not factor intensities reverse at some disequilibri um w (i

w)

is

of no concern in this paper.
9

For further discussion of the minimum~wage transformat ion cUI've, including

the regions of complete specializat ion, see Brecher ( 1974) who shows the following
two results.
p <

p,

First, for all p >

production occurs

p,

production occurs at¾·

Second, for all

on R1T1 , with output (and employment) rising asp de

creases.
'

10

These assumptions imply that the foreign elasticity of imports with respect

to (relative) price is always greater than one in absolute value.

If regions of

· inelastic foreign demand (with g' < 0) were allowed, the analysis would be more
complicated algebraical ly (not geometrica lly), but there would be no change in any
of the main policy results reported below.

This invariance of conclusions has to

do with the fact that an elastic foreign demand (with g' > 0) still would be a
necessary condition at any of the optimal positions considered below.
11

As shown by Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1969), welfare can he allowed to depend

also upon non-consum ption variables.

In the present context, social welfare could be

made to depend upon total employment in addition to aggregate consumption .

For

example, it could be assumed that social welfare is a concave function W[U(c1 ,c 2 ),L]
of U and L; where i3W/aU > 0 and i3W/aL > O, if U and L are both finite.

The analysis

of Part II could be reworked by maximizing W subject to the constraints of the
system, in much the same way that U is maximized below.

For the three

-17-

alternate policy combinations considered in this paper, their W-welfare ranking
( in the case of W-maximization) would be the same as their U-welfare ranking
Unsurprisingly, however,

(in the case of U-maximization performed below).

W-maximization would yield a smaller U and a larger L than does CT-maximization-
except under the first-best policy which would give the same U and the same L
(E)

under either maximization.
12

Use of community indifference curves may require socially optimal lump-

-

sum transfers that depress labor's income below w2 •

If so, it is assumed that

unions--which may be sufficiently powerful to force the producer to pay
are not strong enough to set a floor to labor's after-tax income.

w2-

In other

words, this paper is concerned with a (pre-tax) minimum-wage cons-traint, and
not with a (post-tax) minim'lll!l-income constraint.
13

ror an illustration of the entire consumption-possibilit y frontier, in

cluding the non-linear parts corresponding to complete specialization in produc
tion, see Brecher (1971).
14

In fact, imposing an optimal trade tax will decrease employment when

the home country exports the labor-intensive good, as explained by Brecher (1974).
15 T
•
d o f consumption,
•
.
cou ld b e use d
instea
ax-cum-s ub si• d.ies on prod uction,
to achieve the same welfare levels discussed below.
16

•
tax o f
An a d valorem consumption

imply MPL

2

=

w2 (1

the equilibrium k

+ T ).
2

2

T

2

.
on t h e secon d goo d , would
, imposed

Thus, variations in

(which depends only on MPL

T

2

2

would alter the equilibrium MPL 2 ,

under constant returns to scale),

and the minimum-wage transformation curve [which depends on k 2 as shown by equa
tion (6)].

This complication is ruled out by assuming

T

2

= 0.

More generally,

this complication would arise whenever the domestic consumer and the domestic

-18-

producer faced difrerent money prices for the (second) good which defines the
minimum wage--not the case under simply a trade tax or trade subsidy.
17

• •
•
•
However, if t > 0, imposing
t together with T- may reduce employment below

the free-trade level when the home comtry exports the labor-intensive good, as
suggested by footnote 14.
18

The value of t~': would be zero if the home cormtry had no monopoly power

in trade, as in the case considered by Bhagwati (1968; pages 20-22).
he argued, only a labor subsidy would be needed then.

Thus, as

-19-
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